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BAILMENTS-INNKEEPERS-RESPONSIBLITY FOR Loss OR DAMAGE TO THE GOODS
OF A GUEST.-The plaintiff, a guest of the defendant innkeeper, delivered her
jewels to him for safe-keeping in the defendant's safe. The jewels were stolen.
A statute provided that if an innkeeper kept a safe and posted a notice thereof,
on failure of the guest to deposit such property with him, he would not be
responsible for loss by theft or otherwise. In the event of such deposit being
made, the innkeeper's duty to pay damages was limited to $25o. N. Y. Cons. Laws,
igog, ch. 25, sec. 200. To an action based on negligence the defendant pleaded
a limitation of his responsibility to $25o. Held, that the statutory limitation did
not apply to an action based on negligence. Shaie v. Jacobson, Inc. (1923, Spec.
T.) 121 Misc. 590, 2Ol N. Y. Supp. 781.
The English courts originally held that the responsibility of an innkeeper was
based on negligence. Beale, Law of Innkeepers and Hotels (19o6) sec. 183. In
states following this theory a high degree of care is required. Merritt v. Claghorn
(1851) 23 Vt 177; Baker v. Dessauer (1874) 49 Ind. 28. By the weight of
authority his responsibility is that of an insurer, only the act of God, or of a
public enemy, or the negligence of the guest, being defenses. Butler & Co. v.
Quilter (19oo, Q. B.) 17 T. L. . 159; Willard v. Reinhardt (1853, N. Y. C. P.)
2 E. D. Smith, 148; Pettit v. Thomas (1912) 1O3 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501. The
fact of loss creates a prima facie case and the burden is on the innkeeper to
establish exculpatory circumstances. See Beale, op. cit. sec. 19o. Yet even, at
common law an innkeeper could impose reasonable conditions to his responsibility
upon notice to his guest. Fuller v. Coats (1868) i8 Ohio St. 343 (guest required
to deposit overcoat). But upon compliance with the condition the common law
responsibility applies. Pinkerton 'v. Woodward (1867) 33 Calif. 557; Maxwell
Co. v. Harper (1917) 138 Tenn. 640, 200 S. W. 515; Wilkins v. Earle (187o) 44
N. Y. 172 (compliance with statute). For statutes modifying the common law
rule, see Beale, op. cit. App'x. Statutes as in the instant case requiring goods of
the guest to be deposited have been strictly construed as in derogation of the
common law. Weadock v. Swart (I9IO) 163 Mich. 602, 128 N. W. 734 (gold
watch and chain held not included under "articles of gold and silver manufac-
ture"); Ramaley v. Leland (1871) 43 N. Y. 539 (watch not within "money,
jewels, or ornaments"); contra: Stewart v. Parsonis (1869) 24 Wis. 241; Rains
v. Maxwell Co. (19o3) 112 Tenn. 219, 79 S. W. 114. It has even been held the
notice must be posted as require;1 by the statute and that actual notice to the
guest is not sufficient. Batterson v. Vogel (1879) 8 Mo. App. 24; contra: Purvis
v. Coleman (186o) 21 N. Y. iii. And a statute requiring the guest to deposit his
goods has been construed not to include goods or money necessary for the guest's
personal convenience. Profilet v. Hall (1859) 14 La. Ann. 530; Maltby v.
Chapman (1866) 25 Md. 310; cf. Rosenplaenter v. Roessle (1873) 54 N. Y. 262.
On the other hand, if the guest fails to deposit his goods, even negligence seems
not to render the innkeeper liable. Jones v. Savannah Hotel Co. (1914) 141 Ga.
530, 81 S. E. 874; but cf. Chatillon v. Co-Operative Apartment Co. (1915, Spec.
T.) 90 Misc. Io8, 152 IT. Y. Supp. 593. But where the goods have been deposited
as in the instant case, negligence is rightly held to destroy the innkeeper's immunity
from responsibility above the stated sum. The limitation is framed to protect an
insurer, not a tort feasor.
CONSTrTuTIoNAL LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-PENALTY CLAUSE.-
The defendant employer on refusal to pay an award of the Industrial Commission,
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was sued by the State to recover the award plus a fifty per cent penalty imposed
by Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, secs. 1465-74, on any employer who fails to pay an award
within ten days. The defendant claimed that the penalty clause was unconsti-
tutional. Under Art. IV, sec. 2, of the Ohio Constitution no law can be held
unconstitutional without the concurrence of all but one of the judges. Held, (five
of seven judges dissenting) that the clause was constitutional. DeWitt v. State
(1923, Ohio) 141 N. E. 551.
To be valid a penalty must be reasonable under the circumstances and non-
discriminatory. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers (1907) 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup.
Ct. 28; Beckler v. Am. Ry. Express Co. (1922) 156 Ark. 296, 246 S. W. 1; 26
A. L. IL 1197, note. It cannot be so large as to deter actions to test the validity
of the statute. Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Tucker (1913) 230 U. S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 961;
Superior Laundry Co. v. Rose (1923, Ind.) 137 N. E. 761; (I9zi) 34 HAMV. L.
REv. 327. Several compensation acts have penalties similar to that in the instant
case but have been construed to give the employer an opportunity to contest the
validity of an award before the penalty accrues. Thus the Texas statute imposing
a penalty on the employer who "refuses to pay without justifiable cause" has been
held not to apply to one who on reasonable grounds brings suit to set aside an
award, though he is unsuccessful. Vern. Tex. Ann. Civ. Sts. Supp. 1918, art.
5246-44; Ga. Casualty Co. v. McClure (1922, Tex. Civ. App.), 239 S. W. 644.
The Nebraska provision for a penalty has been held not to accrue where there is
any reasonable controversy until the obligation of the employer is ascertained by
the exercise of proper diligence. Neb. Rev. Sts. 1913, sec. 3666, as amended by
Laws, 1919, ch. 91, sec. 4; Hall v. Germantout. State Bank (1921) lO5 Neb. 709,
x81 N. W. 6og. In Illinois, however, a provision that the employee always can
recover attorney's fees if the award is not paid within twenty days has been
upheld. Freednmn v. Industrial Connn. (ii8) 284 Ill. 554, 12o N. E. 460. It is
clear that the purpose of these statutes is to hasten the payment of the compensa-
tion awards. However, since the Ohio act allows only ten days for a review of
the award, the addition of the large penalty seems coercive. If the awards were
to be paid by weekly or monthly installments the penalty clause might with more
justification be held reasonable; but it is doubtful whether the constitutionality of
the act can be upheld where, as here, the award was of a lump sum with a large
penalty for non-payment.
CONTRACrs-AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION.-The plain-
tiff and the defendant, both domestic corporations of New York, contracted for the
shipment of raisins from the plaintiff in California to the defendant in New York.
The agreement provided that all disputes arising between the parties should be
shbmitted to arbitration before the arbitration committee of the Dried Fruit
Association at San Francisco. The goods were late in arriving and the defendant
corporation refused to accept them. The plaintiff corporation moved for an order
directing that arbitration proceed between the parties. Held, that the agreement,
while valid, could not be enforced in the courts of New York. Inter-Ocean Food
Products v. York Mercantile Company (1923, ist Dept.) 2o6 App. Div. 426, 201
N. Y. Supp. 536.
American courts have been jealous of any attempt to oust their jurisdiction. A
contract therefore which attempts to fix as the sole forum a court in a foreign
jurisdiction, will generally be disregarded by the court where suit is brought.
Slocum 'v. Western Assurance Co. (i89o, S. D. N. Y.) 42 Fed. 235; Nashua
River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co. (1916) 223 Mass. 8, 1n1 N. E. 678;
(19o8) 8 COL. L. REv. 409; (1919) 28 YALm LAW JOURNAL, 190. In England the
courts apparently recognize the validity of such an agreement but refuse to order
the parties to proceed to the foreign tribunal. Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v.
Gresham Life Assurance Society [19o3] I K. B. 249; Kirchner v. Cruban [igog]
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I Ch. 413; The Cap Blanco [1913] I P. 13o. New York by a recent statute has
established the legality of arbitration contracts in general and authorizes a stay of
proceedings in contracts of this nature but does not provide for an order that arbi-
tration shall proceed in the foreign jurisdiction. N. Y. Cons. Laws, Supp. 1920,
ch. 72, sec. 2; COMMENTS (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, go. But the question
in the instant case has been expressly left open. Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg
(1921) 23o N. Y. 261, 13o N. E. 288. Problems under the New York statute may
arise in several ways. (i) Where one party refuses to arbitrate, in accordance
with the principal case the other could not obtain an order from the court directing
arbitration in the foreign jurisdiction. (2) But he could probably maintain suit
in the domestic court for damages on the principal contract. The tendency in
America is to ignore such an arbitration clause in a suit for such damages, even
though the courts admit its validity provided it is not expressly made a condition
precedent. U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co. (1915,
S. D. N. Y.) 222 Fed. ioo6. (3) If the party refusing to arbitrate brought an
action upon the principal contract, it is probable that the courts in New York
under their Arbitration Act would follow the holdings of the English courts
under the English Arbitration Act of 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, sec. 4, and stay
the proceedings at the request of the party who wished to arbitrate. Austrian
Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life Assurance Society, Ltd., supra. This has
no application to (2) since his refusal to arbitrate would probably constitute a
waiver. (4) The party demanding arbitration might sue for breach of the agree-
ment to arbitrate. This remedy is unsatisfactory due to the difficulty of ascer-
taining damages in such a case. (5) There seems no reason why the party
demanding arbitration might not submit his claim to the foreign arbitrator and
then enforce the decree of the arbitrator in the domestic court, provided that the
actual arbitration complied with "due process" by giving the other party proper
notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Feyerick v. Hubbard (192o) 71
L. J. K. B. 5og. These predictions rest upon the assumption that the New York
statute will be liberally construed.
CONTRATs-ANTIcIPATORY REPUDIATION-SUBSEQUENT DEFECTIVE ATTEMPTS TO
P~aoRm The plaintiff, as agent of a Finland concern, contracted to sell the
defendant a quantity of pulp to be shipped from Finland at stated future dates.
Before the time set for the first shipment, the defendant repudiated. The plaintiff
refused to rescind the contract and later made defective shipments which the
defendant declined to accept. The plaintiff sued, before the time set for the final
delivery, for the defendant's anticipatory repudiation. Held, that the plaintiff
should recover, as he had not waived his rights by his attempts to perform.
Lagerloef Trading Co. v. American Paper Products Co. (1923, C. C. A. 7th) 291
Fed. 947.
Where there is an anticipatory repudiation by one party to a bilateral contract,
the other has at once a right to damages for the "breach." Wester v. Casein Co.
(1912) 2o6 N. Y. 5o6, 1OO N. E. 488; Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed. 1919) sec.
385; contra: Daniels v. Newton (1874) 114 Mass. 53o. The repudiator's act is
a waiver of further performance or tender thereof as a condition precedent to the
other's right to damages; nor will compensation be allowed for enhanced damages
caused by continued performance. Ripley v. McClure (1849) 4 Exch. 345; Hart
Parr Co. v. Finley (1915) 31 N. D. 130, 153 N. W. 137; Sarachan & Rosenthal v.
Wilson & Co. (1924, 4 th Dept) 2o7 App. Div. 768, 202 N. Y. Supp. 591; Ann. Cas.
1917 E, 712, note; contra: Roeblings Sons Co. v. Lock-Stitch Fence Co. (1889)
130 IIl. 660, 22 N. E. 518. Notice, as by bringing suit, or a change of position by
the injured party, is sufficient evidence of an election to treat the repudiation as a
breach. Churchill Grain Co. v. Newton (1914) 88 Conn. I3O, 89 At. J121; United
Press Assoc. v. National Newspaper Assoc. (@916, C. C. A. 8th) 237 Fed. 547;
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Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual Duties (1924)
22 Micx. L. REv. 329, 347. But where the repudiator is urged to perform, it has
been held that he may set up as a defense any supervening circumstance which
would have justified him in declining to perform his part. Frost v. Knight (1872)
L. R.. 7 Exch. 111, 112; Dalrymple v. Scott (1892) i9 Ont App. 477; contra:
Cort v. Ainbergate Ry. Co. (I851) 17 Q. B. 126; see Williston, Contracts (1920)
sees. 1297, 1298, 1323. However, by merely extending grace to the repudiator the
other party does not, as he would by consent to a rescission, extinguish his rights
under the contract. Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co. [19051 2 K. B. 543;
Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wilson (1923) 235 N. Y. 489, 139 N. E. 583;
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 5O8; but see Rubber Trading Co. v. Manhattan
Rubber Mfg. Co. (1917) 221 N. Y. 12o, 116 N. E. 789. And as a tender is not a
condition precedent to suit by the promisee, it seems that a defective tender, as in
the instant case, should not of itself be of operative effect Canda v. Wick
(1885) zoo N. Y. 127; Braithwaite v. Foreign Hardwood Co., supra; British &
Benningtons Ltd. v. Northwestern Cachar Tea Co. Ltd. [1923, H. L.] A. C. 48. A
recovery was properly allowed on proof of ability and willingness to perform at
the time of the repudiation. Cort v. Ainbergate Ry., supra; O'Neill v. American
Legion of Honor (1904) 70 N. J. L. 410, 57 Atl. 463.
EJECTMENT-DissEIsIN OF PLAINTIFF'S ENTmE ESTATE-BALANCE OF CON-
VENIENcE.-The plaintiff had a ten-year lease under a contract providing that the
lessor or his grantee could terminate the lease provided certain conditions were
performed. The defendant later became the owner in fee and notified the plain-
tiff to quit The plaintiff refused, and contested the summary proceedings brought
against him on the ground that the conditions precedent were not performed. The
lower court ruled for the defendant but was later reversed and a new trial ordered.
During the time between the two trials the defendant tore down the building leased
and erected a theatre at a cost of over $1ooooo. The plaintiff brought ejectment
Held, (one judge dissenting) that the plaintiff should recover. Golde Clothes
Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres (1923, N. Y.) 141 N. E. 917.
The court intimated that the convenience of the parties will be balanced only in
injunction, not in ejectment, cases. It has, however, been held that an injunction
will issue against such an action of ejectment, where the court wishes to balance
the convenience. Magnolia Construction Co. v. McQuillan (1923, N. J.) 121 At.
734; see (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 21t. And under modem code procedure,
this may be effected more directly and more expeditiously by setting up such facts
as an equitable defense. See Cook, Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 645. Moreover under the Codes which abolish forms of action and the
difference between actions at law and actions in equity, the form of action brought
should not of itself determine the relief to be given. Cole v. Jerman (19o4) 77
Conn. 374, 59 Atl. 425; Cockerell v. Henderson (19o9) 81 Kan. 335, lO5 Pac. 443;
Bruheim v. Stratton (1911) 145 Wis. 271, 129 N. W. 1O92; see Albertsworth,
The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States (I92) lO CALIF. L. REv. 202; see
COMMENTs (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 707. The decision in the instant case
is sound since the defendant was not in the position of an innocent disseisor.
Green v. Biddle (x823, U. S.) 8 Wheat. 1; see Welles v. Newsom (1888) 76
Iowa, 81, 40 N. W. lO5. But even had the disseisin been innocent the same result
would be reached, since courts have generally refused to balance the convenience
where the disseisin as in the instant case is of the plaintiff's entire estate. In such
a case the prevailing rule allows the innocent disseisor the value of the'improve-
ments placed by him on the land. Thompson v. Ill. Cent. Ry. (192o, Ind. App.)
129 N. E. 55; Wakefield v. Van Tassell (19o) 218 Ill. 572, 75 N. E. io58; see
(1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 100.
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FUTURE INTERESTs-LIMITATIONS-FEE UPON A FEE-DEATH WITHOUT
DEsCENDANTS-CONsTRucTiN.-The grantor by a deed effective under the
Statutes of Uses conveyed premises in fee to a granddaughter, her heirs and
assigns, reserving, however, a life estate in himself. It was further provided that
if the grantee should die without children or children's descendants the title should
revert to the living grandchildren of the grantor. Subsequently the grantor died
intestate survived by the grantee and other grandchildren. In a suit to quiet title
it was contended that since the words used gave the grantee a fee at common law,
the limitation to the grandchildren was void as the limitation of a fee upon a fee.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the limitation over was valid; but that since
death without descendants referred to death during the life of the grantor, the
contingency was no longer possible and the grantee's estate was indefeasible.
Harder v. Matthews (1923) 309 Ill. 548, 141 N. E. 442.
Blackstone, referring to the common law conveyance of lease and release, states
that a fee cannot be limited upon a fee by deed, but may be by executory devise.
2 Blackstone, Commentaries, *173, *334; see Rogers v. Eagle Fire Co. (1832,
N. Y. Senate) 9 Wend. 6ri, 628. Such a limitation was considered invalid as a
transfer of a conditional right of entry. A few courts, disregarding the reason
for the rule, have applied this language to deeds operative under the Statute of
Uses. Palmer v. Cook (I896) 159 Ill. 3oo, 42 N. E. 796; Glenn v. Jamison
(i896) 48 S. C. 316, 26 S. E. 677; Printup v. Hill (i9Oi, C. C. N. D. Ga.) 1o7
Fed. 789, changed by Ga. Code, I911, tit. 6, ch. i, see. 3658; but see Roberts v.
Dazey (I918) 284 Ill. 241, i1 N. E. gio; see CommE.NTS (1914) 8 ILL. L. REV.
495; (919) 14 ibid. 458. The holding to the contrary in the instant case settles,
in harmony with both reason and authority, a point long in confusion in the law
of Illinois. Kales, Future Interests (2d ed. 1920) sec. 443; see also Simwnds v.
Si-monds (i9o8) i99 Mass. 552, 85 N. E. 860; Bryan v. Eason (i9o8) 147 N. C.
284, 6 S. E. 71. The decision on the second point in issue, however, seems
questionable. When the intent of the grantor is doubtful, the courts apply to
deeds presumptions of intent originally used in construing wills. Thus if a fee
is devised to A, with a limitation over to B on A's death without descendants, it is
usually said that "death" refers prima fade to death at any time. Britton v.
Thornton (1884) 112 U. S. 526, 5 Sup. Ct 291; Fifer v. Allen (i9o7) 228 Ill.
5o7, 81 N. E. IIO5; Kales, op. cit. 531; contra: Teal v. Richardson (19o3) i6o
Ind. 119, 66 N. E. 435. On the other hand if the fee is preceded by a life estate
and the limitations over exhaust all the possibilities, as to X for life, then to A in
fee, and upon A's death to his descendants, if he leave any, otherwise to B, it is
uniformly held that "death" refers prima facie to death only during the life of
the life tenant. Such a construction avoids the inconsistency that would result
from cutting down A's fee to a life estate. Anes v. Smith (1918) 284 Ill. 63, i19
N. E. 969; Kales, op. cit. 532. The majority of American courts, as in the
instant case, apply the same rule to a limitation over on contingencies that do not
exhaust all the possibilities. Bonner v. Wedekind (1922) 193 Ky. 743, 237 S. W.
394; Satterfield v. Tate (io9o) I32 Ga. 256, 64 S. E. 60; McConnick v.
McElligott (1889) 127 Pa. 230, 17 At. 896; see 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1045, note.
This is justified as a means of securing an early vesting of the estate and of
favoring the primary objects of the testator's bounty. In re Peavey's Estate
(1919) 144 Minn. 208, 215, 175 N. W. IO5, io8; (1920) 4 MiNN. L. REv. 375.
The English courts even in such a case construe "death" to refer to death at any
time. This is said to give to words their ordinary and literal meaning.
O'Mahoney v. Burdett (1874, H. L.) L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. A. C. 388, overruling
Edwards v. Edwards (1852, Ch.) I5 Beav. 357; In re Creagh (I92O, Ch.) i Ir. 8;
Van Luven v. Allison (1901) 2 Ont. L. Rep. i9g. A -few cases have ascertained
the intent of the grantor without either presumption. St. John v. Dann (1895) 66
Conn. 401, 34 Atl. iio; cf. Buchanan v,. Buchanan (1888) 99 N. C. 308, 5 S. E.
43o. And some of the courts applying the rather arbitrary American rule seize
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upon slight indications of a contrary intent to deny its operation. Pennsylvania
Land Co. v. Justi (i9o6) 121 Ky. 765, 9o S. W. 279 (grantee's estate should
"return back again" to the family) ; Shivers Estate (1874, Orphans' Ct. [Pa.])
9 Phila. 354 (trust created on death of life tenant to pay limitations over) ; cf.Jordan v. Hinkle (190o) In Iowa, 43, 82 N. W. 426 (difference in ages of testator
and legatee shown as extrinsic fact). This might well have been done in the
instant case. As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion, the deed directed that
upon the happening of the contingency title was to "revert and go to and vest in"
the ultimate grantees.
GIFTS-CHosES IN ACTION-WRITING NOT UNDER SEAL EVIDENCING INTENT.-
The owner of bonds held by a bailee wrote a letter to the bailee expressing her
intent and desire to make a gift of the bonds to the bailee and his wife. After
the owner's death, her representatives filed a bill in chancery to recover the bonds.
Held, (one judge dissenting) that the letter was effective to create an irrevocable
gift inter vivos. Northern Trust Co. v. Swartz (1923, Ill.) 141 N. E. 433.
Despite early conflict among the writers, choses in action may generally be the
subjects of valid gifts. Costigan, Gifts Inter Vivos of Closes in Action (igi1)
27 L. QUART. REV. 326; Rundell, Gifts of Choses in Action (1918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 643. In determining what constituted an overt act sufficient to evidence
a gift intent the older cases required a written assignment in addition to an actual
tradition. 2 Kent, Commentaries, *44o; Matthews vz. Hoagland (1891) 48 N. J.
Eq. 455, 21 At. 1O54; but see Snellgrove v. Bailey (1744, Ch.) 3 Atkyns, 214
(gift causa mortis of bond valid without assignment). By the modern rule
delivery of the instrument alone is sufficient where the chose in action is evidenced
by a written document. Farrell v. Passaic Water Co. (1913) 82 N. J. Eq. 97, 88
Att. 627; L. R. A. 1915 D, 733, note. And by the better view a transfer by deed
is also sufficient. Malone's Committee v. Lebus (1903) 116 Ky. 975, 77 S. W. 18o;
contra: Allen-West Corn. Co. v. Grumbles (i9o,, C. C. A. 8th) 129 Fed. 287. A
few decisions have even held that a writing not under seal may create a valid gift
of a chose in action. SctMauer v. Vons Schauer (1911, Tex.) 138 S. W. 145;
Burkett v. Doty (1917) 176 Calif. 89, 167 Pac. 518. And the instant case soundly
applies the same rule where the chose in action is already in the possession of the
intended donee. Cf. Cowen v. First National Bank (19Ol) 94 Tex. 547, 63 S. W.
532. These decisions are logical steps in the evolutionary process making choses
in action freely transferable.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITY TO LICENSEE FOR CONCEALED Davscr.-The
defendant A leased a garage to the defendant B. Both knew that the elevator
needed repairs for the purpose intended. The defendant lessee covenanted to repair.
The plaintiff, who was in the company of an owner of an automobile which was
stored in the garage, was injured when the elevator fell due to the excessive load it
was carrying. The lower court found for the plaintiff against both defendants.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be affirmed. Warner v. Lucey
(1923, 3d Dept.) 2o7 App. Div. 241, 2Ol N. Y. Supp. 658.
The duty of an occupier to a licensee is merely to warn him of known concealed
defects. Lewko v. Krause (1922) 179 Wis. 83, 19o N. W. 924; Burdick, Torts
(3d ed. 1913) sec. 554; (1918) 2 MINN. L. REv. 534; but see Stanwood v. Clancey
(i9og) io6 Me. 72, 75 Atl. 293. But to one who comes on the premises to transact
business in which he has an interest in common with the occupier he owes a duty
to use ordinary care to discover defects. Indernaiuer v. Dames (1866) L. R. I
C. P. 274; Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort (1905) 53 Am. L.
REG. 227; (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 93. The absence of such a common
interest in the instant case makes the plaintiff a licensee. Fleckenstein v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1917) 91 N. 3. L. 145, 1O2 Atl. 700; (1918) 16 MIrlC.
L. REV. 458. The defendant lessee was then correctly held liable since he failed
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to warn the plaintiff. See Johnson v. Glasier (igi8) 40 S. D. 13, 166 N. W. 154;
(xg18) 4 IowA L. Bur. 208. In the absence of fraud, a lessor who has leased a
tumble-down house is said not to be liable to parties lawfully on the premises.
Cavalier v. Pope [1906A H. L.] A. C. 428. But in a few jurisdictions a failure to
repair after covenanting to do so renders him liable. Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co.
(1914) 158 Wis. 626, 149 N. W. 489; contra: Willis v. Snyder (I92O) I9o Iowa,
248, i8o N. W. 29o; (1921) 68 U. PA. L. REv. 297. And he is generally liable
when he repairs negligently. Zelzer v. Cook (i9og, App. T.) 62 Misc. 471, 115
N. Y. Supp. I73; Ann. Cas. 1915 D, 829; but see Thonmas v. Lane (1915) 221
Mass. 447, iog N. E. 363. Or where there is a defect in that part of the premises
which he controls. Fitzhinans v. Hale (1915) 22o Mass. 461, 107 N. E. 929;
contra: Fairnian v. Investment Society [1923, H. L.] I A. C. 74; (1923) 32 YALE
LAw JouRNAL, 742. Similarly where there is a "nuisance" on the premises at
the time of the lease. Patten v. Bartlett (1914) 1II Me. 409, 89 AUt. 375; L. R. A.
1915 B, 374. In such cases the lessee's knowledge or covenant to repair does not
excuse the lessor. Lusk v. Peck (19o9, 4th Dept.) 132 App. Div. 426, 116 N. Y.
Supp. 1051; 3 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence (6th ed. 1913) see. 7o9a. The
landlord is liable for concealed defects known to him at the time of the lease.
Ames v. Brandvold (1912) 119 Minn. 521, 138 N. W. 786; L. R. A. 1916 F, 1o86.
But the lessee's knowledge or covenant to repair relieves the lessor from liability
since the injured party's rights against the lessor are said to be no greater than the
lessee's. Harper v. Fall (1896) 63 Minn. 520, 65 N. W. 913; I Tiffany, Landlord
and Tenant (1912) 652. But the distinction between a concealed defect and a
nuisance is not determinable from the cases. See Smith, Torts Without Particular
Names (192o) 69 U. PA. L. REv. 11o. When premises are leased for a public use,
the owner must use reasonable care to discover defects. Junkermnann v. Tilyou
Realty Co. (1915) 213 N. Y. 404, io8 N. E. i9o. And here also the lessee's knowl-
edge or covenant to repair does not excuse the lessor. Folkmian v. Laner (1914)
244 Pa. 6o5, 91 Atl. 218; see NoTEs (1921) 21 CoL. L. REV. 262. In the instant
case the court regarded the lease as for a public use and hence the lessee's covenant
to repair did not excuse the lessor. The extension of the "public use" doctrine
to include such property as a garage as well as the number of exceptions to the
general principle of non-liability of a lessor indicates a tendency towards a rule
rendering the landlord liable to those lawfully on the premises.
PARENT AND CHLD-ESANCIPATION-RIGHTS OF CRaiITORs.-A crop was raised
by minor children pursuant to permission given them by their father to cultivate
certain land and keep the proceeds. A judgment creditor of the father levied
execution upon the crop. The children intervened. Their claim was allowed and
the creditor appealed. Held, that the decree be affirmed. Marlar v. Smith (1924,
Miss.) 98 So. 338.
Emancipation of a child may be either partial or complete. Memphis Steel
Construction Co. v. Lister (1917) 138 Tenn. 307, 197 S. W. 902; Wallace v. Cox
(igi6) 136 Tenn. 69, 188 S. W. 6II. Partial emancipation is limited to the
extinguishment of the father's rights in the child's earnings for a certain period or
for certain purposes. Tillotson v. McCrillis (1839) II Vt. 477; Tennessee Manu-
facturing Co. v. James (1892) 91 Tenn. 154, 18 S. W. 262. The father does not
thereby relieve himself of his duty to support. Porter v. Powell (189o) 79
Iowa, 151, 44 N. W. 295; Wallace v. Cox, supra. But this duty may be merely
to provide necessaries not covered by the child's earnings. Lufkin v. Harvey
(1915) 131 Minn. 238, 154 N. W. io97. The father has the power to revoke this
partial emancipation and revest in himself the right to the child's earnings after
revocation. Wilson v. McMillan (1878) 62 Ga. 16; Memphis Steel Construction
Co. v. Lister, supra. In the so-called "complete emancipation" the father divests
himself not only of these beneficial relations, but also of his duty to support.
Rounds v. McDaniel (igog) 133 Ky. 669, 118 S. W. 956; Panther Creek Mines v.
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Industrial Commission (1921) 296 Ill. 565, 13o N. E. 321. But this is true only
if the child is physically and mentally capable of supporting himself. Iroquois
Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission (r92o) 294 Ill. io6, 128 N. E. 289; Simmons
v. Stewart (I923, Ky.) 248 S. W. 892. No act of the father, however, can change
the status of the child after complete emancipation. Campbell v. Campbell (1856)
ii N. J. Eq. 268; McCarthy v. Boston & Lowell R. R. (1889) 148 Mass. 55o, 20
N. E. 182. But it seems the child himself may always disaffirm the emancipation
agreement and restore all the filial relations. A few courts apparently recognize
this power in the child, but have then called the relation a partial emancipation.
Porter v. Powell, supra; Lufkin v. Harvey, supra. Even under partial emancipa-
tion a revocation can be effected only by the father and not by his creditors.
Wilson v. McMillan, supra; Lord v. Poor (1844) 23 Me. 569; Trapnell v.
Conklyn (1892) 37 W. Va. 242, 16 S. E. 57o. Nor can creditors reach the child's
future earnings as a fraudulent conveyance. Johnson v. Silsbee (187o) 49 N. H.
543. The instant case is therefore sound.
QuAsI-CoNTmAcTs-MoNEY LENT UNDER MISTAKEN AUTHORITY OF AGENT To
BoRRow-DEposIT OF CHECK TO CREDIT OF PRINcIpAL-The president of the
defendant corporation representing that he was borrowing for the corporation
obtained from the plaintiff a check payable to the defendant. The check was
deposited to the defendant's account under a forged indorsement of the defendant's
treasurer. The same day the president -withdrew a like amount by a check bearing
the forged signature of the treasurer and appropriated the proceeds. An action
was brought for money had and received. Held, that the plaintiff could not
recover, since the defendant had no knowledge of the transaction and enjoyed no
benefit. Credit Alliance Corporation v. Sheridan Theatre Co. (1923, Tr. T.) 121
Misc. 656, 2o2 N. Y. Supp. 217.
Where an agent without authority borrows money some states refuse the lender
a recovery from the principal at least at law, even though the money was expended
by the agent for the benefit of the principal. Railroad National Bank v. Lowell
(1872) 109 Mass. 214; Spooner v. Thompson (1876) 48 Vt. 259; Otis v. Stockton
(1884) 76 Me. 5o6. Others allow a recovery where the money was used to pay
the debts of the principal. White River School Township v. Dorrell (igoo) 26
Ind. App. 538, 59 N. E. 867. It has been held that there may be a recovery where
the money was used to discharge a lien, but not a personal claim. Title Guarantee
& Trust Co. v. Haven (igog) 196 N. Y. 487; 89 N. E. 1O82. The more equitable
view is to allow a recovery to the extent of the benefit actually received by the
defendant. Leonard v. Burlington Mutual Loan Assoc. (1881) 55 Iowa, 5g4, 8
N. W. 463; First National Bank v. Oberne (1886) 121 Ill. 25, 7 N. E. 85. Even
in a state holding this view, however, the principal has been relieved from liability
where the money was simply placed to his account and immediately withdrawn,
and appropriated by the agent Fay v. Slaughter (1902) 194 Ill. 157, 62 N. E. 592.
This is in accord with the rules governing bank deposits. A sum deposited in a
bank only presumptively creates an obligation to the person in whose name it is
deposited and payment by the bank after notice of the rights of the true owner is
held to render the bank liable for conversion. First National Bank v. Bache
(1872) 71 Pa. 213; Egbert v. Payne (1881) 99 Pa. 239. And where the deposit
is made in the name of a third party the bank may in an action by that party show
that he was not the real owner. Aido/k v. Savoy Trustee (1911, App. T.) 128
N. Y. Supp. 618. Thus, where the president of a corporation deposited corporate
funds to his personal account, the bank is justified is transferring the amount to
the account of the corporation. Forey v. Aimerican National Bank (1915) 136 La.
298, 67 So. ao. The mere crediting of the account of a party without his knowl-
edge creates no rights or duties in him; at most he has the power to ratify the
act of the agent. See Schaap v. State National Bank (1918) 137 Ark. 251, 208
S. W. 3o9; but see contra: Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) 123; (1924) 24
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CoL. L. REv. go. In the instant case, theref6re, no ratification having occurred,
the court properly held that the defendant received no such benefit as justifies
a recovery. It seems unsound to attach any liability to the ownership of a bank
account, merely because it has been used by third parties as a medium for their
fraudulent transactions. The plaintiff's proper remedy is against the drawee bank
for the payment of a check on a forged indorsement of the payee. See Prudential
Insurance Co. v. National Bank of Commerce (192o) 227 N. Y. 510, i25 N. E. 824.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CoNTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND--ATTEmPTED REPUDIATION
BY VENDEE No BAR TO LATER SuiT.-The defendant contracted to sell certain
lots to the plaintiff for $i6,ooo. The plaintiff paid a $7oo deposit She later
repudiated, refused to pay further sums due, and sued the defendant in assumpsit
to recover the deposit on the theory that no memorandum of the transaction had
been made sufficient to take it out of the statute of frauds. The supreme court
on appeal held for the defendant Before the case was retried, the plaintiff had
the suit transferred to the equity side of the court, filing a bill for specific per-
formance of the contract. The defendant meanwhile had sold the lots to a third
party. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance, but that the
deposit be returned as damages because of the disposition of the property. Barton
v. Molin (1923, Mich.) 195 N. W. 797.
An executory contract for the sale of land is generally said to vest the equitable
ownership in the vendee. I Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. i919) sec.
368; 5 ibid. sec. 2261. The vendor is thus trustee of the legal title for the vendee
as security for the purchase price and the relationship of the parties is treated as
analogous to that of mortgagee and mortgagor. Lewis v. Hawkins (1874, U. S.)
23 Wall. iig; Brown rv. Canterbury (19o7) ioi Tex. 86, 104 S. W. 1055; 3
Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 2763. The vendee's interest, the so-called
"equity of purchase," may be foreclosed in equity. Abbott v. Molestad (1898)
74 Minn. 293, 77 N. W. 227; (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 641. And it seems that the
resulting position of the vendee is treated as a property interest, as he has most
of the incidents of ownership. The authorities divide on how far repudiation of
contract obligations by the vendee affects his right to specific performance. In
the first stage of the instant case, the contract was held a valid one with dicta to
the effect that the plaintiff was not entitled to repudiate the contract and recover
any of the deposit Barton v. Molin (1922) 219 Mich. 347, 189 N. W. 74. The
plaintiff was here declared entitled to specific performance, her ownership being
unaffected by her repudiation of the contract. This is analogous to the situation
of a lessee after breach of a covenant not amounting to a breach of condition;
the relationship of lessor and lessee still continues. 2 Tiffany, Landlord and
Tenant (i912) 1364. But where a plaintiff has been held to have the power by
such repudiation to destroy his estate as owner and recover his deposit less damages
for breach of contract, or when he has rescinded the contract on other valid
grounds, his property interest in his purchase is destroyed, with the right to
specific performance on which it depends. Davis v. Wagner (I922, Tex. Civ.
App.) 237 S. W. 612; Payne v. Graves (1834, Va.) 5 Leigh, 561; see Kendall v.
Pinnix Realty Co. (192) 183 N. C. 425, 1ii S. E. 705 (rescission and suit for
the deposit on grounds of fraud). Given the rule as to the return of the deposit,
both lines of reasoning are consistent in their treatment of the right of specific
performance. The defendant in the instant case could in the first instance either
have returned the deposit or have sued to foreclose the vendee's interest in the
property. Fitzhugh v. Maxwell (1876) 34 Mich. I38; see Underwood v. Slaght(1921) 213 Mich. 391, 1$2 Ni. W. io6.
TORTS-WRoNGFUL DEATH-RELEASE BY INJURED PERSON FOR CONSMERATION
No DErENs.-The plaintiff's husband4 injured in the defendant's employ while
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engaged in interstate commerce, settled for his injuries and executed a release. He
later died and his wife as administratrix sued for the loss to her and her children
under the Employer's Liability Act, Act of April 22, i9o8 (35 Stat. at L. 65), and
amendment, Act of April 1o, 191o (36 Stat. at L. 291). The former creates in the
administrator an action for wrongful death, and the latter allows tort actions of
deceased to survive. From an instruction that the release, if properly executed,
was a defense to both actions, the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the judgment
should be reversed, as a release is no bar to the action for the wrongful death.
Goodyear v. Davis (1923, Kan.) 22o Pac. 252.
Death statutes are of two types :-death acts, following Lord Campbell's Act
(1846) 9 & Io Vict. c. 93, and based on the actual pecuniary loss to the deceased's
dependents, and survival acts, removing death as a defense to causes of action for
pain, suffering and loss of time. Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act (2d ed. 1913)
sec. 26. The two rights are generally recognized as distinct. Whitford sr.
Panama Ry. (1861) 23 N. Y. 465; Seward v. Vera Cruz (1884, H. L.) L. R. IO
A. C. 59. So by the better view the representative may avail himself of both
remedies. Leggott v. Great Northern Ry. (1876) L. R. I Q. B. Div. 599;
Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power Co. (19o6) 1O4 Md. 332, 65 Atl.
49; NoTsS (19o2) 15 HAxv. L. Rxv. 854. Some courts, however, restrict the
death acts proper to cases of instantaneous death. Sawyer v. Perry (1895) 88
Me. 42, 33 Atl. 660; Dolson v. Lake Shore & M. ... Ry. (igoi) 128 Mich. 444,
87 N. W. 629. Others restrict survival acts to cases in which death results from
causes other than the injury. McCarthy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. (1877) 18
Kan. 46; Holton v. Daly (1882) io6 Ill. 131. And others make the remedies
elective. See Legg v. Britton (189o) 64 Vt. 652, 24 Atl. ioi6. The Federal Act
has been interpreted to give two rights of action. Michigan Cent. R. R. v. Vree-
land (1913) 227 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192. And, after the amendment, to allow
a recovery by the representative on both rights in one suit. St. Louis, I. M. &
S. Ry. v. Craft (1915) 237 U. S. 648, 35 Sup. Ct. 704. With apparent inconsis-
tency the same courts that allow a double recovery hold that a settlement with the
injured person is a defense to an action for wrongful death. Read v. Great
Eastern Ry. (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 555; State v. United R. R. & Electric Co.
(1913) 121 Md. 457, 88 At. 229; Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 124. This is somewhat
anomalous in the absence of legislative intent to give but one action. Littlewood
v. Mayor of New York (1882) 89 N. Y. 24; Hill v. Pennsylvania R. R. (1896)
178 Pa. 223, 35 Atl. 997; Elliott, Railroads (3d ed. 1921) sec. 2065; NoTES (19oo)
14 HARV. L. REV. 290. But the Federal Act was intended "not to take away
from employees rights theretofore existing" but "to extend the right to recover
for death or injuries .... to be as inclusive as any of the similar remedial state
statutes superseded in their operation." See Senate Report No. 432, 6Ist Cong.
2d Sess. 12-15; House Report No. 513, 61st Cong. 2d Sess. 3-6. In several states
a release had not been a bar. Rowe v. Richards (1915) 35 S. D. 201, 151 N. W.
IOOI; Wall v. Massachusetts N. Ry. (1918) 229 Mass. 5o6, 118 N. E. 864; Black-
well v. American Film Co. (1922) 189 Calif. 689, 209 Pac. 999. The words of the
amendment, "there may be only one" recovery for the same injury," unfortu-
nately have been applied to preclude the fair and desirable result of the instant
case. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Oliver (1919, C. C. A. 5th) 261 Fed. I.
TRUSTs-PowER OF ATTORNEY TO COLLECT A CHOSE IN ACTION AND APPLY TO A
TRUsT-REvcATION BY DEATH.-By a voluntary deed of trust from B to the
plaintiff, B was to receive the income for life and after her death half of the
fund was to be divided among the defendants. B also gave the plaintiff a power
of attorney to collect any property to which she was entitled under a decree of
court to be entered, and a letter authorizing the plaintiff to receive the property
and transfer it to itself under the agreement of trust executed by B. The decree
was entered, and the plaintiff collected part of the property and applied it to the
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trust. B died, and the plaintiff as executor of B's estate collected the rest of the
property. The plaintiff brought action for judicial settlement of its account.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the property delivered to the plaintiff after the
death of B did not belong to the trust fund but fell into B's residuary estate.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop (1923, Ist Dept) 2o7 App. Div. 356, 202
N. Y. Supp. 456.
By the prevailing rule a parol gift of a chose in action not evidenced by a
common law or mercantile specialty is at most an authority to collect in the right
of the donor. Cook v. Lue (1893) 55 N. J. L. 373, 26 Atl. 8o3; contra: Jones'
Adm'r v. Moore (1898) io2 Ky. 591, 44 S. W. 126. It may therefore be revoked
by the donor. Dow v. Prescott (i815) 12 Mass. 419. And is usually revoked by
death. Organized Charities v. Mansfield (igog) 82 Conn. 504, 74 Atl. 781;
contra: Read v. Long (1833, Tenn.) 4 Yerg. 68. But so far as the power has
been exercised before revocation it is effective. Frederick's Appeal (i866) 52 Pa.
338. An interest in the subject matter of the agency will make it irrevocable by
death. Hunt v. Roimnanier (1823, U. S.) 8 Wheat. 174. But the interest of a
trustee is not sufficient. Organized Charities v. Mansfield, supra. So in the
instant case the property collected after B's death was properly considered not a
part of the trust fund, and distinct from that collected before the death. It seems
that the latter should be interpreted to have become a part of the trust fund by
virtue of a transfer of title to the trustee after the exercise of its power and not,
as the dissent intimated, by virtue of an original declaration of trust. The case
is probably one in which a failure to take the proper legal steps prevented the
settlor's intent from being carried out. If, as was pointed out by the majority
opinion, she had made a gift of the chose in action by deed of assignment to the
plaintiff in trust, it would not have been revoked by her death. DeCaurnont v.
Bogert (i885, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 36 Hun, 382. Or she could have declared herself
trustee of the chose in action for the benefit of herself and the defendants.
Estate of Smith (i8gi) 144 Pa. 428, 22 Atl. 916. Usually some act of delivery
is required to make this effective. See Govin v. DeMiranda (1894, Sup. Ct.) 76
Hun, 414, 27 N. Y. Supp. io49. In the instant case the court could hardly have
found either of these, even by a strained interpretation.
UNFAIR CoMPETITIoN-IRus UAL TO DEAL WITH PERSONS TRADING WITH A
CoMPETITOR.-The petitioner, a wholesale grocery company engaged in interstate
commerce, threatened to discontinue purchasing from a manufacturer if the manu-
facturer should continue to sell directly to a competing wholesaler. The Federal
Trade Commission, proceeding under the Federal Trade Commission Act of Sept.
26, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 717), which declared unlawful "unfair methods of compe-
tition" in interstate commerce, issued an order directing the petitioner "to desist
from . . . . hindering or preventing any . . . . firm from the purchasing of
groceries . . . . direct from manufacturers, or attempting so to do," and from
hindering a manufacturer from selling to any person he might wish. From a
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing the order, the Commission
appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed, as the acts of the petitioner did
not constitute an unfair method of competition. Federal Trade Comnmission v.
Raymond-Bros. Clark Co. (1923, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 162.
The court adopts the general statement that one may refuse business relations
with another for any reason. Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society v. Glasgow
Fleshers Assoc. (1898, Outer House) 35 Scot. L. 645; Macauley Bros. v. Tierney
(i895) ig R. I. 255, 33 AtI. 1; 2 Cooley, Torts (3d ed. 19o6) 587. But motive
may make such conduct unlawful. Thus when done for the purpose of influencing
a juryman it may constitute bribery. See State v. Woodward (19o4) 182 Mo. 391,
407, 815 S. W. 857, 862; cf. Caruthers v. State (1883) 24 Ala. 4o6. Or to induce
a breach of contract. Schonwald v. Ragains (912) 32 Okla. 223, 122 Pac. 203;
cf. Quinn v. Leathen [i9oI, H. L] A. C. 495. Under the Sherman Act, refusal
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by a combination of individuals or companies, in interstate commerce, to deal with
another unless he cease trading with a third person is regarded as being in unlaw-
ful restraint of trade. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi (191o) 217 U. S. 433,
30 Sup. Ct. 535; Binderup v. Pcath Excalnge (1923, U. S.) 44 Sup. Ct. 96. It is
conceivable that similar conduct by an individual or single corporation might have
the same effect, even where the refusal does not appear to contain a monopolistic
tendency. The question is essentially economic rather than legal and might well
be left to the discretion of the .Federal Trade Commission, which has the machinery
to determine whether a method of competition is "unfair." But the Supreme
Court has declared that only such conduct as was considered unlawful before
the Federal Trade Commission Act will be so regarded now. Federal Trade
Commission v. Gratz (1920) 253 U. S. 421, 427, 40 Sup. Ct. 572, 575. Under
this restricted view, the court has abundant authority at common law for its
decision that the .mere refusal to trade with one who deals with a competitor is
not unlawful. Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society v. Glasgow Fleshers'
Assoc., supra; Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co. (1902) 50 W. Va. 6I, 40
S. E. 591. Under a more liberal view, which seems more consonant with modern
commercial conditions than an adherence to common law principles, a different
result could be reached. See Oliphant, Trade Regulation (1923) 9 A. B. A.
JOUR. 211.
WILLS-EERcISE op DIscRETIoNARY PowER BY SuccEssoRs OF TESTAMENTARY
TRuSTFss.-A testatrix devised to her husband to hold in trust for her son, with
power to invest as he saw fit, to pay over the income in such manner and proportion
as he thought best for the support and maintenance of the son, his wife, and
children, and to pay over at any time any or all of the principal to or for the
benefit of the son. Upon the original trustee's death, the plaintiff was appointed
successor. The advice of the court was sought to determine whether or not the
plaintiff had power to make advances from the principal requested by the son, and
whether the income should be used for the benefit of the first or second wife of
the son. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the powers survived to the plaintiff
and that the income should be used for the benefit of the present rather than the
first wife. Greenwich Trust Co. v. Converse (1923, Conn.) 122 Atl. 916.
When a discretionary power is given a trustee by reason of personal confidence
imposed in him and no contrary intent is expressed, the power will not inure to his
successor. Whitaker v. McDowell (igog) 82 Conn. 195, 72 Atl. 938; Hazard v.
Bacon (1920) 42 R. I. 415, io8 Atl. 499. But where a power is attached to the
office of trustee it will pass with it. Mercer v. Safe Deposit Co. (1900) 91 Md.
102, 45 Atl. 865; Perry, Trusts (6th ed. 1911) sec. 503. Whether or not a power
is attached to the office is a question of intent. Bradford v. Monks (1882) 132
Mass. 405; Llquire v. Lee (1905) 121 Ga. 624, 49 S. E. 834. It is sometimes said
that when there is no intent expressed, the discretionary powers should be prima
facie personal. Virginia Trust Co. v. Buford (192o) 123 Miss. 572, 86 So. 356;
cf. (ipog) 23 HARv. L. REv. 59. Other courts say that it is given prima faei.e to
the office, as the testator should express any contrary intent In re Smith [19o4]
i Ch. i39; see In re Blakely (1898) i9 R. 1. 324, 33 At. 518. If the intent of the
testator is to confer a benefit as in the instant case, the discretionary power should
be co-existent with the beneficiary rather than the trustee. Though the range of
discretion is very wide, the case may well be sustained on the ground that when
the exercise of a discretionary power is necessary to carry out the purpose of the
testator, it should be given to the successor. Chase v. Davis (1876) 65 Me. io2;
Matter of Wilkin (19o5) 183 N. Y. 104, 75 N. E. 1105. In cases of this sort
equity may assist in carrying out the intent of the testator, and in some cases
will take over the administration, substituting equitable rules for arbitrary power.
Weiland v. Townsend (88) 33 N. J. Eq. 393; Tilly v. Letcher (1919) 203 Ala.
277, 82 So. 527.
